Diane Wilson Interview, Part 2 of 2

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misc.

DW: Okay. Okay. So the situation was, at the time I first started my little environmental group and I had my first meeting was-was, this was a huge 2.7 billion dollar chemical expansion. The-Phil Gramm, who was the Congressman at that time, and had a war chest for the-the-the time when he can be run for President. He was getting all of the-he was getting all of the praise for bringing this huge multinational down. His campaign-his former campaign manager at that time, Bill Leyton, was at-was at that time, was the head of the EPA Regional Six in Dallas. And the permits had been guaranteed. They had been also, not only guaranteed, but they were to be moved in record time, in like three to six months. They were going to have the water permits, their air permits out. And this was a plant that was already ready to bring in the workers, to start expansion. They had the contracts in line and they were ready to go.

And-and little beknownst to anybody else was that, not only did I just unexpectedly say well, I

00:01:37 - 2288 want a permit hearing on this, not only that, but I found out later is that this was an outlaw polluter in Taiwan. In Taiwan, it's-it's one of the fastest, economically rising places in the world, but the only thing keeping abreast with its economic raising was it's environmental destruction. And I mean, the island is devastated by its environmental destruction. And they were so bad in Taiwan that when Chairman Wong wanted to build this plant over in Taiwan, they had the farmers, the villagers throw stones at him and refuse to allow him to build it. And so, what did we do? We brought him to Texas. I mean, totally kicked out-and so he brings his whole-his whole reputation, his way of doing business, and he brings it down here to the state of Texas. And not only does the Department of Commerce-the Chamber of Commerce, do they not even ask him one thing about their-his environmental record. You know, it's like-you know, what's your-how did you-how did you do business? How did-wh-what's your-what's your philosophy on environmental protection?

They gave this company 250 million dollars in tax abatements. I mean, we got a little small school district. I mean-and it

00:03:13 - 2288 was so poor that they were fixing to eliminate 17 teachers and our school district was given 100 million dollars in tax abatements.

And so, here was this set deal, this en-environmental polluter, this known environmental polluter, no questions were being asked. They were giving him the whole store. They were giving him the whole county.

They were-matter of fact, we got a mercury underwater Superfund site. They were going to be trenching the mercury underwater so they could get these bigger fleets of ships through to load up the PVC and just go all over the world with it.

And I asked for a hearing on them. And it's like the whole world caved in on me. And it was like-like I said, I not only had the plant managers, I had Chamber of Commerce, Economic Development, I had Senators, I had county commissioners and they were all telling me that I wasn't being a good citizen, that I was hysterical, that I didn't know what I was doing because I was just a woman, I was just a fisherman. And, matter of fact, at one point, I had-I had tried-I have tried, in the beginning, to do things the right way. I-like-I-in my environmental group, I got a vice-president and I got some directors and I got a-a secretary and a treasurer and then the company threatened to sue me and every

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single one of my directors quit. My-my secretary and treasurers, everybody quit. So I found out that, one, I was going to be doing it alone. I only had the lady who worked with me in the fish house who would get behind me and say okay, Diane. You're doing good. Just-and she would, you know, I-I couldn't get anybody to stand up with me, so I would go to permit hearings all by myself. If I would do a demonstration, I was all by myself. And the only people I could get was out of state. I mean, out of-either out of state, or the activists out of Louisiana or I could get an environmental group in Houston to come down and, if-if I was going to have a press release. Because that's the only way I could have anybody. Otherwise, I would be by myself.

And so, here you are. You're fighting a permit application. And I was fighting-in the beginning, I was just fighting that here was the biggest thing Texas had ever had. I mean, the biggest thing we'd ever had. It was PVC, polyvinyl chloride. We're talking vinyl chloride, we're talking ethylene dichloride and like, there is known links with vinyl chloride to cancer of

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the liver. I mean, there are known-and this is a polluter. He's notorious and there was not going to be the first study on what this plant was going to impact us. I mean, he's there on Lavaca Bay, they're going to discharge 15 million gallons a day of vinyl chloride, EDC, chlorine, all these heavy metals, copper, you name it. And right across the causeway is a little-is-is a Superfund site. A mercury contaminated Superfund site. And-and they have-they have chemicals-Formosa had chemicals in its discharge that would react with the mercury and make an even more deadly toxin to the seafood around there. But there was no questions. There wasn't going to be any kind of study.

And so, I went through all the processes. I did a petition. I gathered names. I filed permit applications. I filed lawsuits because-because, for not doing an environmental impact statement, they were absolutely violating federal law. I mean, there was no-there are no two ways about it. They were violating it. And so, I had lawsuits. I had petitions. I had permit hearings. And-and I remember the first time with-even with all that information and what a polluter they were.

The information was out on what a polluter

00:07:28 - 2288 they were, is that the information had been leaked out of the EPA and it was headlines in the Houston Chronicle that Formosa was not going to have to do a study. It was like, this is a done deal. It was like-and so, I remember the-the activists in Houston that was-would come to press releases with me and he said, well, it's over with, Diane. He said there's nothing else you can do. You said-you fought a good fight and let it go. He said it's-it's a done deal. They're going to do it. And I'm like no, they're not going to get it. And it's like-and he kept saying well-well, there's nothing else you can do. You know, it's like the parade is over with. You've done-you've done a good job. Nobody is going to say anything about you quitting.

And I was like-it's like the bay-the bay was personal with me, it was a part of who I was. And I knew, there were-th-there was no doubt that this company was going to come in and they were going to create another death to that bay. They were going to create another blow and they-they were going to-they were going to kill it. And I-I had-I had no doubt that-they had every

00:08:43 - 2288 indication of it. Their whole history was of it. And-and with the-the-the-the fact that the EPA and the state wasn't even going to question it? It was like they weren't going to stop them on anything. And I said nope. They're not-they're not going to do it.

And I-and off the top of my head, I said I'll do a hunger strike. And-and I re-I still remember the-it was Rick Abraham and he looked at me and he said Diane, you can't do a hunger strike. And I said oh, yeah. I can do a hunger strike. And he said women don't do hunger strikes. And he said especially women in Texas don't do hunger strikes. He said in California, they do hunger strikes. They don't do them in Texas. And I said, yeah, I'm a-I'm going to do a hunger strike. And I didn't know the first thing about a hunger strike. Didn't know the first thing. Didn't know how to do them. I just know you just didn't eat food. And-but once I said it, I knew. I knew enough about human nature that if I didn't act on that impulse, if I slept on it, I'd wake up the next

00:09:42 - 2288 morning and say oh, thank God I didn't do the hunger strike. Because, you know, I mean, you was going to look real stupid, a woman going out there and saying she's doing a hunger strike. And so, I immediately got a phone, called the Victoria Advocate reporter and said I'm starting a hunger strike for an EIS on Formosa. And she said when? And I said right now. I'm starting it right now. And so, I found me a shrimp boat in Lavaca Bay and I started my hunger strike right there on that boat. And-and like I said, I had never-I'd-I'd-I had never did it before. I didn't know how to do it. I didn't know how to organize it. And-and, matter of fact, I did everything wrong that I could've possibly done wrong. I didn't even have a phone, so I was on the boat with no phone. It was like nobody even-even for the first week, people didn't even know, outside of the county, they didn't even know I was on a hunger strike. And the only ones who knew it was Formosa and they would regularly-they would send their men in their business suits and it was like, they would show me off. They would bring down their corporate,

00:10:52 - 2288 their little engineers and then they'd come on the boat and they'd say well, this is Diane. Don't she look stupid. They would say you look real stupid, Diane. They would just tell me, you don't know-they said well, you're shooting yourself in the foot on this one. You just look real-people in town think you look real stupid. And-and I just kept up, you know, I'm doing a hunger strike. And, eventually, within the-a week had passed and, matter of fact, the shrimper that owned the boat, he-he didn't now know I was on his shrimp boat. That shows you how unorganized I had been. He saw, when a camera crew came from Houston and he looked on the-the news that night and he saw a woman on his shrimp boat on the news. So he came down to Port Lavaca, where I was stationed at, and he said if you don't get off this boat by tomorrow, he said, I'm going to pitch you off. And I'm like, I'm a shrimper like you are. I-you know, you know, I'm just trying to help the bays. And he said you ain't a shrimper, you're an environmentalist. And he

00:11:59 - 2288 was going to pitch me off that boat. So I-so I just decided, well.

So I got up off the boat and I had the-the lady that was kind of-she would bring me water down to the boat and so I said, just take me down to the park and there was a park right beside Formosa. And-and I said I just need a little airing out. And I-and I didn't tell her I was being kicked off the boat and I had to-I had to move it. And so, she took me down to the park and after she left-I made sure she left, and I just walked around and went right around the park and sit down on Formosa's front lawn and just sit there. And you want to talk about people getting the haywire. And suddenly, everybody was coming out of the office. Because I was sitting there, right in broad daylight, right in front of the sign, just leaning up against a tree. And, pretty soon, here come security and here would come some regulatory affairs and they're like, Diane, won't-won't you come inside. Let's sit inside where it's cooler. I was like, no. I just feel real good right here.

And-and by

00:13:11 - 2288 doing that, and then calling the EPA and telling them I was going to take the hunger strike to their doorstep, they changed-in two weeks of a hunger strike, I got exactly what I wanted. And I got-we got the EIS. And because they had to do the EIS in Texas, Formosa was trying to buy-to build a rayon plant in Louisiana. Because they had to do one in Texas with their Formosa plant, they had to do the one in Louisiana and it killed the one in Louisiana. So they never did get to build the rayon plant. But it stalled the-the plant operation about two years.

And so, that's where it started moving. And-and, like I said, when you have-when you have the mayors, when you have the commissioners, when you have Senators, when you have justice of peace. When every elected official that is supposed to represent you has tie ins with the chemistry-I mean, the chemical industries. Where they have contracts, they have security contracts, they

00:14:18 - 2288 have construction contracts. That's-I mean, it's an all-it's a total tie in. And nobody wants to stop them. If there's kickbacks, nobody wants to prosecute them. If they have spills, nobody wants to prosecute them because they want a computer system. And I know-I went down to Corpus Christi and two inspectors went to their files when they found out I was dealing with Formosa. They went to their files, pulled files out and gave them to me and said we can't get anything done. It goes up into this bottleneck and it just stops. And he said, you do something with this. And so that shows you where the-the environmental agencies are. For the state, for the EPA, there is too much political pressure. There is too much of an-of a total networking and bonding. You know, and like the-the-one of the directors at the Water Commission-at that time was the Water Commission down there, I mean, he'd had his application in soon as he ret-got out of there, in about a year, he had his application in for Formosa Plastics. I

00:15:28 - 2288 mean, it's-it's known among environmentalists. They call it the swinging door. It's like they're just waiting so they can get out and make more money with-with industry. So you don't-one, you don't have the political will with these agencies and the other is like, you just don't have the funding. And you don't have environmental enforcement. You don't have these inspections. They all know when they're going to have an inspection, whether it's OSHA, whether it's the state environmental, whether it's EPA. I mean, they like give a week's notice. You know, and then the plant manager. It's well known. The-the-the workers will laugh about it. You go talk to the workers, the workers will laugh about it. They said yeah, we knew OSHA was coming down. He met the plant manager, the plant manager took him to Victoria, they got a nice dinner and by the time he got back, he made through-one line through that-that whole unit in about

00:16:17 - 2288 five minutes. They said we barely saw his coattails hanging out. And that is what the people are supposed to be trusting. And-and-and the-the irony-the irony of it is like every time there has been-I've had a big environmental meeting and I-and, oh, I would get these people in the back and they said, you don't know nothing about this and leave this to the agencies. It's their business. And it's like, you have just got no idea about what's really going on. And I believe in the politicians, I had not one single-not one politician would-would step up to the plate. I remember I went to the most-and he was just running for a-on the Democratic position. And he was a liberal. He had pictures of Martin Luther King on his wall and I went up to him and I said just bring up the environment and he said you're known as a maverick and I'm not going to commit political suicide. And so, I mean, that's our liberal consciousness in Texas. It was-it

00:17:26 - 2288 was political suicide to talk about it. And, you know, and the rest of them have got-they got contracts, you know. They got contracts. They're getting campaign contributions and economic development. And so you-so you end up-you-I'd-absolutely-I remember the day when I found out just how-I mean, absolutely, they will look you straight in the face and lie up a storm. You know, and it was-I mean, it was an obvious lie and I-and I remember the day when it dawned to me how I could count on, you know, on the elected officials. And I remember, I had an address book that had-a notebook that had all their names and their numbers and I went in and got it and ripped it to pieces. It was like, it's not going to come from them.

DT: Well, did you get help from anyone within the companies? Were there any whistle blowers or were there helpful people in the staff of the agency? You mentioned that some of them gave you files. Where were you getting your information and other support?

00:18:29 - 2288 DW: Well, I guess and-and-and I guess the reason why-the reason why I've been able to get some publicity is I got dynamite information from workers, even corporate people within the plants would give me information. Inspectors from-out of the Texas Water Commission would give me documents. And-and what it boils down to is-is you-you have-you have some good people. You have good people. There-there are good people everywhere. But the system does not work for having these problems corrected because the bottom line is money and it's as fast as you can and it's to hell with the environment. And I would have-I would have these workers that would try to talk to the plant manager, they would try to talk to their supervisor. And, you know, and some of them-th-they got-they got exposed. And then, once you get exposed, you're out. They fire you. You know, because there's no unions down here. There's no

00:19:31 - 2288 protection. So, they fire you. You're out. Here they are, contaminated with ethylene dichloride or vinyl chloride and they got their cancer-I mean, their liver counts are out of the roof. And they're gone. And, I mean, and then, they can never get a job again. And then, what are they to do? I mean, their house payment's due, their truck payment's due. And-and I had-on one of them-and I came to his house and he couldn't work anymore, he couldn't weld anymore because he was welding into the pipes and they were-had like EDC, vinyl-ethylene dichloride in them. He was cutting in to-welding into the pipe and you're-you're supposed to have them where-where there's nothing-where there's nothing in them. They're supposed to be cleaned out. All the chemicals out because these welders go in and they-and they cut the pipelines. And the stuff just falls all over of them. And so, they get exposed so many times, it ruins their health. And-and this one I had talked to, you know, he had-he had talked-tried to talk to the plant manager, you know, and they tried to talk to a doctor. And it's like, to prove the

00:20:39 - 2288 links between exposure, I mean, it's like going-oh, you know, they're going to say you smoked cigarettes. They're going to say you ate barbeque, because you know, they love to say it's the barbeque down here that is causing all the cancer. That's a fact. And in Louisiana, it's the bar-it's the Cajun sauce. That's what causing all the cancer down there. And so, you have these fellows that-you know, and-and I'm not their first option. They, you know, they-they-they look at me and like, is she crazy or what? But they run out of options and I'm the last option so that's the reason why I got whistle blowers. And they had dynamite information. I knew about kickbacks, I knew about FBI investigations, I knew about buying off of Senators, I knew about burying of drums, spills. You know, payoffs to EPA officials. I mean, I got this directly from the workers. They gave me cancelled checks. I remember Susan Wong wrote out a little 25,000 dollar check to one lady to keep her quiet. You know, and-and I-I got-I still got copies of cancelled checks. And so I got all of this dynamite information and-and I would take it

00:21:58 - 2288 to an investigative reporter, and usually it was the one in Houston, and it was-I can't tell me how many times Formosa Plastics was front page of the Houston Chronicle, on the kickbacks, on the buyouts, on the contamination.

And so, I have-I have got most of my help from the workers and I've become a strong ally. I've-I'm-I'm a-I will-I will always speak up for the-for-for the worker. And, matter of fact, I was probably the only-when I finally-I did a hunger strike and got an agreement with Formosa and the unions went berserk because it was the first time an environmental agreement had provisions for the workers in it. And, you know, and I-I just thought it as a matter of fact. It was just like-I mean, any-anybody that leaves out the equation of the workers, you're missing it because they-they are the allies and they're just people and people are just-the environmental movement, I think, is reluctant to go that way. It's-they're-it's-whether they're intimi-timidated by them. And a lot of times, the industry uses that possible antagonizement because I remember one time I did a-a demonstration

00:23:24 - 2288 against Formosa Plastics and I had-I had my kids there, I had a couple old ladies, I had a couple old deck hands. So there was like ten of us and the company hired 300 of the workers, they paid them overtime, for being out there. And I mean, it was like start a fight, start a fight, see if you can-you know, and it was-it was intimidation. It was like-and the-the thing was, I-I felt such-such-it's such an irony because it was this huge banifit-benefit for Formosa and it was every politician. I think there were 500 elected officials, wearing gowns and furs and Cadillacs. They were given this big benefit for Y.C. Wong. I was on one side and all these workers were on the other and it was like, they're being exposed, they're-they're being kicked out and here between us ringed in all of this political agenda. The jewels, the wealth, and I was like, that is such a sad thing that they have put us in opposition there. And that was-that was their agenda, is to-is to put this opposition, for us to fight, for us to clash. And what did I ended up doing is, I aligned with them and the-the workers became my-my best source of information.

00:24:51 - 2288 When things happened, it was the workers that called me. So that's why-couple of times, I remembered the plant people didn't know what I know and they would call me and say Diane, where did you get that information? You know, and it was because I-I knew stuff that was going on. I knew where documents were. I knew where spills were happening. I know where cover-ups were and-you know, and there was a lot-because there's a lot of-there's a lot of engineers or corporate people in there that have no idea.

Because people-people that don't have a real understanding of the way industry-a chemical plant out there, how it really functions. And especially, when you got one like Formosa Plastics, that was Taiwanese, so you had two different levels. You had the Taiwanese that were really running it and then you would have this kind of Americanized version that was kind of for show. And they-and they-they had absolutely no-they had no ability to change anything. And I remember, at one time, I was getting information from the Regulatory Affairs and he was-because he said they were trying to

00:26:02 - 2288 make some changes because they-they had started learn about them. And so-but the other level had totally banned them from going into the units. So they just kept them in the administration. So, you know, so you've got this-this whole little life that's really going on and-and people think this agency's-the EPA's taking care of it and the-there-there's inspections.

(misc.) DW (David Weisman): Two questions related to that. One is, without revealing your sources, what are the techniques to making friends of the workers? Obviously, trust is important and they know that somehow you're not going to leak who they were. But what might be some techniques for making friends with the workers? And the second would be, what retaliation does the management take against you? Did you feel that there were guys in unmarked sedans following you at all times? And so these would be two questions, I would have, particularly address them to David.

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DW: Okay. One of the-the-I guess the ways that I started approaching the workers and-and matter of fact, it was a little strategy that Cesar Chavez said. And it's-and it's-and it's difficult, even hardnosed environmentalists find it. It's this door-to-door thing. It's like-like you-you-like there was a lot of the workers over there at Point Comfort and I would go and knock on the door and try to talk to a worker there. And a lot of them, I mean, had them slam-and I mean, these are-these are fellows that are getting memorandums sent around by the company saying this woman is trying to shut

00:27:47 - 2288 down this facility. She's trying to literally shut it down and that you're going to be out of a job. And these are fellows with families, with truck payments, with house payments and they are scared. And so, they're-a lot of them are angry. And so, you have to just be there to communicate and show that you want to talk to them because otherwise, I-I-I-I think the environmental movement has this real reputation of being real middle class and absolutely nothing to do with the working class. I mean, it's-it's a whole...

(misc.)

00:28:31 - 2288 DW: Okay. A lot of times I just went over to Point Comfort and I just started knocking on the doors and asking to speak to workers. And I knew-I-I knew a lot of their names and I knew where a lot of them lived because I would talk with one worker, he would give me a couple more workers and then, each one-so I gradually developed this list of workers. And I would go and start talking to them.

And-but also, another-a strategy is just being out-being out there consistently, so when they-say, for instance, a worker got exposed. It's-when he went to the plant management and they wouldn't do anything. When he went to OSHA and they didn't do anything. And you run out of options and so, they would-they would come to me. I remember one of the workers calling me and said what are my rights? You know, she worked all night long, out on the tire. She-you know, it-it-by six in the morning, she was tired and she slipped and

00:29:33 - 2288 fell. And the company fired her. They said oh, you were drinking. And it's like, she wasn't-she wasn't doing any of that, but-but she had no other option because there was-you know, this was a town that had 15 percent unemployment. So you have a whole line of workers just ready to take her place. And you know what, anybody that's got any kind of exposure or they've hurt themselves is-they get rid of them. So you finally-you're the person they eventually have to talk to. And, I always-I always-even, you know, I-I've been threatened to be sued. I've been in-had them do a deposition against me and I never, ever gave the name of the worker because their-their life. Their, you know, they wouldn't be able to get a job anywhere around these parts. So I always guaranteed their confidentiality and, let's see.

DW (David Weisman): You also mentioned about a class issue about the workers, that the environmentals were perceived as being middle class.

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DW: Okay, but-and a-a lot of the workers, like I said, oh, they-they don't get involved in environmental issues because they-they feel like it's a classist type thing. It's-it's like-almost like a-a luxury to be an environmentalist. And even, I go to some environmental meetings and it's mainly white faces I see. And they're very professional people and th-and-and they don't understand the shrimpers and they don't understand the workers. You don't see the workers there; you don't see the shrimpers there. And I remember even one professional was talking at a big environmental conference and he said this thing-this thing will not get over until we start bringing in the working class people because those are the ones that-I mean, this is their community because this is a classist, almost a racist thing.

Is that these companies, they build in these small, working towns where you got high unemployment, where you got people with a bit-they don't have a great deal of high education. They don't go in the middle where you got scientists and-and a lot of these professional people. They-

00:31:49 - 2288 they-they go into these areas where they think they're going to be so beat down, they're not going to make an outcry.

And I know, when I started making a headway, though, is like, you know, suddenly-like I had my boat sabotaged twice. You know, I was out in the middle of the bay and I had a net over and I happened to glance over and I noticed the boat looked low in the water and I lifted up the hull and I mean, the boat was full of water. And somebody had-they had jerked off the wires to the-it's an electric pump that-that you always keep in case you ever hit something and you don't know it and it'll automatically start putting water out. So they had ripped the wires off. They had taken the bilge pump wires off and they had loosened the stuffing box. And a stuffing box is the-you-you got a rudder and a propeller, it turns on the end. And a stuffing box, it keeps the propeller and the shaft turning, but if you loosen it too much, I mean, all this water floods in. And so, that is one of the things, the critical points, shrimper checks everyday is you check your stuffing box. And someone-and I had checked it that night and that morning when I went out, I was already in drag and the boat was sinking. And I

00:33:11 - 2288 don't even know what was going on. So-so that happened twice. My boat was sabotaged twice. I-and I had the helicopter landed in my front yard. Shot my mother-shot at my mother in law. Killed the dog. Shot at the house.

And-you know, and the sheriff's department, it's like they couldn't care less. They couldn't care less. You know, sheriff's department wants a computer system. The ambulance-if you try to get how many workers are being hurt. The ambulance is getting defibrillators. The churches are getting all kinds of stuff. The libraries are getting on computers. And so, you can always tell when there is a dilemma with the industry because suddenly, you can ask for anything. Anybody in the county can ask for anything and they'll get it. Because you-you want to-it was like we're giving to the community. We're giving to the community. And-but they are-very definitely, they-they try, when you start making a inroad, they start trying to intimidate you. And especially when you're-you-you-you know, you're-people are afraid to do it. They can't even get loans at the bank because these people are sitting as directors of the banks, you know. And-and-and so

00:34:30 - 2288 they don't speak out. Their husband works at the plant, they'll lose a job. Their cousin works at the-works at the plant. You know, and it's everybody-especially in a small town like that. It's like everybody is connected. And so, they-they become very frightened and intimidated.

Privately, they think you're doing a good job. But, you know, I've had cards. Anonymous cards, anonymous phone calls telling me you're doing good, you're doing good. Somebody's got to do this, but I can't. You know, and I'd have workers telling me when they're-when they're burying drums of waste and when they're having spills and-and so you-and so I've-I've-I've become used to doing solitary actions.

And that's where-and especially when you don't-there's-you can't work with the-seem to work within the-the establishment. Because I believe, the rules, they make the rules. It's their playing board. And it's-and it's not level. And so,

00:35:33 - 2288 I-I-I do my civil disobedience. I-I do my unreasonableness. And-and it-and it works. And-and I believe you put-you put your-you put yourself on the line. It's-it's more-it's more than a cause. It's-it's your-it's your life and it's-and-and-and, to me, I guess, where I can do it, I see-I see what I do as almost like a myth. I get this-I-I guess it's I'm a little bit of a mystic, maybe, from being out in the water. And you get this big-big picture and you see all your struggles as this mythic struggle and-and-in-in the trials you come to is like something to overcome. It's something so much bigger and you're not ever separate from it. It's not just a cause. It's not just a-an issue. It's something you can't just drop because if you drop it, you're killing the-the best part of yourself.

DT: Can you tell about some of the protests you've done? The direct actions-I know there was one where you took your shrimp boat...

00:36:45 - 2288 DW: Yeah. I guess I've done-to get Formosa to zero discharge; I did at least three hunger strikes. One was over 30 days; it was a water-only hunger strike. Then the last one, which really, I think, really outraged them so much, they-they decided to do zero discharge is I was fighting their wastewater permit. I had an appeal. And I was doing this all by myself. I had-my lawyer had quit. He signed an agreement with them so I didn't have a lawyer anymore. I was writing my own briefs. I was sending in my own-my own resources, my own documentation and I-I can still remember going into, where you had to fax all this stuff to them-I don't-at the critical time. And then you would get the response from the company lawyers. And I remember one time, it just started faxing, faxing and it was filling up the floor and I was like-this sinking feeling. It was like oh, my God. And I just went out and shut the door. It was like I wasn't even going

00:37:46 - 2288 to look at it. Well, this is these critiques from the company's lawyers. And it's like I just can't believe she's so stupid as to think this because, you know, I was putting out this information. But-but anyway, so-oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. My action. Okay, so I had-I had had this appeal in Washington and had legally, I had stopped their permit. They could not move until a Washington federal judge decided whether they could have a discharge. And so, one day I was on the phone, talking with the EPA lawyer-and my name is Diane and Formosa's lawyer's name is Diane. And so, she thought I was Formosa's lawyer. And so, she was-they were-she was just discussing about their wastewater discharge and how it was doing and how many gallons and I was like, what? It's like, you're not supposed to be discharging. You know, I got it blocked. And here they were discharging. The state knew it. EPA knew it. Formosa knew it. It just-the

00:38:57 - 2288 public didn't know it. And it's like-and so, the reality is-is whatever they're going to do, they are going to do. It does not matter how many laws they break. That's just the reality. That's what it boils down to.

And it was like-it was like I-I-I could-I could not stand to just let it go like this. And-and-and-and you have to-you have to do something to grab people and say this is not right. It's like people get so used to compromise that they're finally so compromised, they don't even an arm anymore and-and they look down, like I got a whole complete arm. And their whole arm is gone. And so, I was like. And so-and just off the top of my head, it's-I-I-I-I knew I was going to sink something and I knew it had to be my own boat because one, while I do civil-civil disobedience, it always-I don't-I don't do damage to anybody else. I bring it-it's a personal thing. And so, I felt I had to sacrifice my boat. And-and the-and the reality is it is a truth. That boat is nowhere as-as valuable as that bay. And it's

00:40:17 - 2288 like, well, how has it got where we think a boat is more valuable than a bay? It's not. And so, in reality, I really wasn't doing that much. But, in the way life is twisted, it's like oh, your boat. It's like a forum. It's like-I mean, how can you do something like that. So I-I took the motor out of my boat, because if I had spilled the diesel and if I had spilled oil in the bay, everybody would've looked at the oil and said oh, look at that polluter. And they wouldn't have said anything about Formosa putting 7 millions gallons a day of wastewater out there illegally. That wouldn't have been a issue. It would've been me. So I took the engine out, because I intended to sink the boat. And I got a shrimper to pull me out in the dead of night. And I was going all the way to Lavaca Bay and I was going to get Formosa's discharge and I was going to sink it right on top of that discharge. And it was like, it was going to go down and the only thing was supposed to

00:41:18 - 2288 sticking up is the mast pole. It was going to be a monument to Formosa's wrong and evil deed of destruction, what they were doing to that bay. And it was just going to be a monument.

And-except that the Coast Guard got wind of it, so I had three boatloads of Coast Guard and they said that I was a terrorist on the high seas and 15 years in the federal pen and 500,000 dollars in penalties. And-and they had-they said if any shrimper dared towed me out there any further, because I was-I was-I was almost there. I was-I was probably like half a mile away from the discharge point. And that they would confiscate their boat, too. And so the Coast Guard confiscated the boat. And, matter of fact, there was-I spent the night on the boat, tied up and the-the Coast Guard spent the night, there was three truckloads of them, in a-in trucks because they were afraid, somehow or another, I was going to that boat. And still, I don't know, maybe they thought I was going to fly it out there. But they stayed around because they was afraid I

00:42:22 - 2288 was going to somehow get that boat out there.

But the shrimpers, who normally haven't been supporting me because they-you know, they-they-they just quit believing. They just quit believing you can make a difference. They were so taken by what I was doing. They all got in their shrimp boats. The Vietnamese and the Anglos and the Hispanics and it was a huge norther that had came in, so it was a really rough time out in the bay. And, on Lavaca Bay, when it's really rough, you can sink a tanker, it can get so rough. So it was very dangerous. But they all took their boats and they did this blockade and this protest. And it was after that, Formosa said-it was like, what is it going to take to shut her up? And so that's when I got zero discharge.

DT: Can you explain what zero discharge involves?

DW (David Weisman): And back us up a little bit with this sort of the science of how you came to it, for those in the audience who might not be environmentally conscious.

DW: Like what? DW (David Weisman): What zero discharge.

(misc.)

00:43:31 - 2288

DW: Okay. Every chemical plant-every city has waste and it's generated and they take the pipelines and they dump it out into a waterway. They-sometimes they dumped into the rivers. Sometimes they're dumped into intercoastal canals. Sometimes they're dumped directly into the bays. And, like all of the bays around-all the chemical plants down here, on the average, they at least dump 5 million gallons a day apiece. Some, like City of Houston, they got 40 outfalls. They got huge amounts of discharges are going into the bay. And zero discharge, it was actually-it was a part of the 1972 Clean Water Act. In the 1972 Clean Water Act that was endorsed by Congress, that was passed, it said we have a goal of zero pollutants by 1985. That was the goal, that was the vision. It was like-and the thing of it is, we put people on the Mars-I mean, we put people on the Moon, we sent up satellites, we got all this technology and it's like, we can make zero

00:44:47 - 2288 pollutants going into that bay. We can have so little discharge. We don't even need a pipeline out there.

And-but by 1980's, they took that Clean Water Act and they changed the goal. So then it became how much can a bay stand? What's the holding load? How much can it take? And it just all depends on the modeling and-and you get your environmental engineers in and the permit writers in and we figure, you know, you do your little calculus and you come up with something like I think that bay could take this.

You know, and they don't talk about the synergistic effect, about chemicals working together or whether there's six plants together, putting in stuff.

And then, also that they monitor their own discharge. So it's like if we have a discharge, it's like oh, we're supposed to report that ourselves because nobody else is reporting it.

So, no wonder you have Superfund sites. No wonder you have bays that are contaminated and closures. No wonder you have birds that are diseased. No wonder you have fish in

00:45:51 - 2288 Lavaca Bay that have mercury contents and the crabs with the mercury content and when the shrimp uptaking it. No wonder all of this is going on. It's-this is the state of our waterways.

And my-my goal, my vision was zero discharge. Exactly what the Clean Water Act was. It's that there should be no pollutants. And the thing it is, this is not pie in the sky. This has been around for-this technique has been around for 20 years and it began originally because-because places like Saudi Arabia, South Africa, where there is no water, you can't afford to throw away water if you don't have any and you want to build a chemical plant, you can't afford to be constantly hauling in these millions of gallons of feet of water you got to have everyday. So they recycled it. There's techniques to totally recycle the entire thing. But over here in America, we got the mindset we got all the water we want. We got the bay where it's free to dump. And so, they do. And mine was I-and-and also, the-the public does not realize zero discharge is out there. Any-anyplace I have went to and talked to the public and said

00:47:10 - 2288 you can do zero discharge, they're like what? You mean, there's such a thing? And it's like yeah, there's such a thing. You go to the companies, there's like there's no such thing as that. There's no such thing. And you keep it up and they say well, we can't do it. And then, pretty soon, it's like, you know, but-but you have to, so far, I have had to wrestle the plants down to get them to zero discharge.

And, you know, and I believe it's-it's like this hundredth monkey thing because you reach a-a-this critical point and it's going to be a way of doing things. That's-that's the way this change happens. You may have to get a few reluctant players in the beginning, but after awhile, they're going to accept it as this is the way to do it. And-and that is-I feel like it's my-my role. That's the role I play is to bring zero discharge to this country.

DW (David Weisman): Okay.

DT: Could you tell us how your efforts in direct action and traditional sort of appeals finally brought Formosa around and what the resolution of that story was?

00:48:24 - 2288 DW: The end results of my attempt to sink that shrimp boat was that Formosa sit down with me and I brought in a environmental engineer, Jack Matson from Penn State. And-and it's very critical to have a person on the activist side who understands the concept of zero discharge because even while you get companies to talk about it, their mindset the whole time they're discussing this with you is to go back exactly what they were doing. So your-your dilemma is to convince them and keep showing them how they can do it. And because we always put in the-the agreements I made, and probably why they agreed to them, is not only environmentally superior, but economically feasible. We had to show, by sound science, that it was environmentally superior, economically feasible. And-and you can do it. Matter of fact, Jack Matson, who teaches environmental excellence at Penn State and has worked-did many zero discharge pulling processes at a lot-in a lot of plants, is that any chemical plant can go zero

00:49:35 - 2288 discharge. It's like a chemical plant takes, perhaps, 2 percent of its capital budget to do the wastewater. And for like 2 percent more, you can go totally zero discharge. And it's like each chemical company has to be customized. You know, like one thing may work for one chemical plant that doesn't work for another, but it can be-it can be done for every chemical plant. And with Formosa Plastics, the first agreement, we got 33 percent of their wastestream recycled. We saved 2.6 million gallons of freshwater a day. And we also-and-and it was also, we started the second part of it to do-it was zero discharge across all mediums. And, not only the wastewater, but the air, the land. You know, the waste that goes to the land.

Because you can take-when you do these techniques, you can take the waste from it, the solid product, add something to it and make a whole new product. Like with Formosa's, you can make high-grade gypsum wallboard. And they can make money on it. You know, it's-it's like-it's an imitation of-what do they call it, biological mimicry? It's like the environment does not waste nothing and we don't have to either.

And I do know after I did the zero discharge

00:51:09 - 2288 agreement with Formosa, and like I said, it took about-it was 1994. I started in 1989. It was 1994 before I got zero discharge out of them. But, as soon as I did that, I walked over to Alcoa Aluminum and I said-I remember walking in the door and I said well, do we do zero discharge or do we do the other thing? And I was-I was red-I was ready. Just let me know. And they-they kind of looked at each other and about fifteen minutes, they agreed to zero discharge. So I did it with zero discharge with Alcoa Aluminum. So-so a lot of it is you get on this momentum and people see what you do and they know where you will go, how far you will go. Because I think a lot of it-the industry will figure, you know, we can tire these people out. You know, it's like-like getting rid of a lawyer, you know, just dump documents on him. Just overwhelm him. Get him in a black hole. But when they see you won't quit. You know, they used to call me-they called me a-a nut. Everybody said I was a nut. And now they say I'm a

00:52:14 - 2288 persistent nut. And so, you know, it's-and so I got the zero discharge from Alcoa and then I fought for zero discharge on DuPont. And I went on a 30-day hunger strike on them to get zero discharge and I remember, I even went it-took it to Delaware and did it in front of their corporate headquarters.

And the interesting thing that came out of that is the Chemical Week magazine, they did an article on zero discharge and the people that do zero discharge tech-technology, they said the-just in that month time we did this whole media focus on the hunger strike and zero discharge on DuPont. Zero discharge. Zero dis-it quadrupled the demands of people calling in to zero discharge technology. It quadrupled. And so all-to me, that means all it has to do is just get out there. And you-and get it to where it's on people's lips and so they start asking for it. The companies themselves started saying, okay, show me what you got. And-and that's the

00:53:30 - 2288 whole point of this-this mo-momentum.

And-and also, I-I've got the-it used to be the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers and now it's the Paper Workers have aligned with the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers. And they en-endorsed on their national platform zero discharge. It's because it does not remove jobs. It makes their jobs safer and I can't tell you how many workers have come to me and said we don't want these bays destroyed. I take my kids out there. We live next to it. You know, I've been around a bay my whole life and-and they do not want to see the bays destroyed. So my best supporters-every time I went with zero discharge, I always got the workers. I got the unions on those.

00:54:50 - 2288

DT: So, well, let's see if we can find some sort of a way to sum this up. You've worked so long on trying to show the importance of the bay and of the environment, in general. And of the possibilities for improving the way industry works and lowering the kind of impacts on the bay and on the environment. What kind of advice can you give to others who might be activists or concerned individuals about how they can follow your lead?

DW: Well, I just-if I have-ever have one message, because I've-I've had an opportunity to go to different places and speak. And if I ever have one message, and it's really not so much I tell them to do zero discharge. I tell them one person can make a difference. And I am-I am probably the-the most unlikely person because I didn't have the leadership ability. I didn't have the speaking. I didn't have the education. But the one thing I did have was my passion. And that's all that matters. And even Gandhi said it's a myth to believe that you got to have the people and that you got to have money. It's because you don't need-in the beginning, you don't need none of that. All you have to do is have a vision, have an intent and just go right for it. And it's like-and it's like

00:55:46 - 2288 you step out into empty space and something is there, where your foot will reach solid ground. And it's-it's-it's-it's-it's-it's-it's visionary. To me, it's visionary. It has something to do about hope and-and about integrity and it's about your-your path. It's-it's-it's about your life. And it's-you know, this old thing, as above, so below. It's like there's-there's nothing separate. There's no division in that philosophy and anybody-anybody can do what I did. And I always encourage them is to step out, take a risk and it will change your life like you cannot imagine.

DT: Good.

(misc.)