AS: Well, I think at the time, you know, there was-there was a tremendous amount of national interest and concern about nuclear-in the late seventies. I mean-and it-and it-covered a broad interest of concerns. For me, the-the-the two things that brought it to a head were first, Three Mile Island, and second, Karen Silkwood. And both of those things happened in the late seventies, and so there was a-an intense concern about nuclear power. At the time, the South Texas Nuclear Project at Bay City was under construction. And so, a-a group of us in the Brazoria-Matagorda County areas, wondered, you know, whether our plant would have some of the same problems that had occurred, for example, at Three Mile Island. And I-to me, that was a legitimate, you 32:45 - 2186know, question to ask. What we found at the South Texas Project was that it had been commenced with only about ten percent of the design complete. And so, first and foremost, it was-it was-construction began before there was any completion or closure on the design of the plant itself. And that resulted in some major changes along the way. It resulted in intense pressure on the contractor, you know, to get the project done, and it resulted in overruns that probably were-were-caused that plant to go from an initial estimate of six or seven hundred million dollars to something like six billion dollars before it was complete. But the real controversies-and the-and the-and the-area that I worked in-was that I developed a-a relationship with workers in the plant, who disclosed to me, confidentially, that the-many of the inspections-that the whole 34:02 - 2186nuclear construction process is characterized by un-an unbelievable redundant layer of paperwork and inspections-of every weld, of every concrete pour, every wiring connection. And that is part of what the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, you know, uses to-to try to ensure safety. And what was happening in the South Texas Project was that the pressure to complete the plant was so great that the inspectors would simply sign the forms and not inspect-not do the inspections. And there were periods in-for example in the containment vessel on Unit One, in which they went for almost a year without ever actually performing an inspection. And all of that documentation was fabricated. And so, it was-it was a-it was a bad deal. And, fortunately today, it seems 35:01 - 2186like, you know, as a result of all of the controversy, the plant is, you know, is functioning. But it certainly had some very, very major concerns at that time. And, it was an interesting thing for me because I, you know, I would go to places like Palacios and Port Lavaca and meet with pipe fitters and welders and concrete technicians, you know, at, in the middle of the night because they were concerned about their welfare and they would-they would give-they would help me with my investigation at-at risk, certainly, to their jobs. So, I wrote a story-a-a number of stories-the most-the principal one was published in the Texas Observer in the late seventies about the plant. DT: What was the reaction to the story and some of the disclosures ..36:00 - 2186